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Abstract
We investigate the claim that the establishment of property rights in an economy in transition
would create its own demand for the enforcement of laws to protect those rights. Our model
contains a government seeking activities to accomplish certain objectives that depend on public
support for the enforcement of the rule of law. It also contains agents who interpret the activities
of the government as signals as to the intent of the government to enforce the rule of law. The
agents use the signals in their choice of whether to support the objectives of the government. With
both the government and the agents playing an active role, we establish conditions under which
the activities chosen by the government will maximize its benefits and, at the same time, maximize
the constituency in support of enforcement. These conditions provide a basis for the argument
for the implementation of the big-bang policy in economies in transition. However, when these
conditions do not hold, we show that in pursuing its own goals, the government reduces support
for the enforcement of the rule of law, which, in our model, leads to an increase in corruption.
Two characteristics play an important role in these conditions: the initial level of corruption in
the economy and the types of activities the government chooses to undertake. We present four
examples to determine the relative importance to our conclusions of each of these characteristics.
JEL Classifications: K42, P14, P26, P51, D72
Key words: Rule of law, corruption, big-bang, shock therapy, gradualism, transition
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Moving Toward the Rule of Law in the Face of Corruption:
Re-examining the Big-Bang
1. Introduction
The fall of communism in 1989-1991 inspired many western economists to propose procedures
by which the formerly centrally planned economies might be transformed into market economies.
Relatively early-on, two distinctly different points of view emerged as to how to accomplish the
transition, one characterized as the "big-bang"1 and the other as "gradualism." Proponents of both
views, while counseling different sequences of reforms and optimal time paths over which the reforms
should be implemented, envisioned the same end result: the former communist countries would
leave the world of central planning, becoming, at the end of the process of transition, recognizable
market economies. The debate over speed and timing was a debate over method: the end-point, a
functioning market economy, was assumed to be attainable by all, independent of method.
While no one would deny that market economies depend on certain institutional frameworks,
for example, a functioning legal structure, one of the most controversial aspects of the big-bang
approach was the claim that privatization needed to occur almost immediately, even before a
functioning legal system was in place to govern property rights. The basis of the claim was straight-
forward: ownership would create its own demand for laws to protect that ownership. Thus, the
proponents of the big-bang approach did not argue that enforced legal structures were unnecessary
for the transition from plan to market, but rather that they would be created as a result of the
rapid change in ownership structure.2 The most highly visible country to implement the big-bang
approach was Russia. Yet, Russia is also highly visible as a country where the "rule of law" is weak.
Is it possible that rapid mass privatization, in advance of the institutional structures of a market
economy, created a climate that deterred, and might continue to deter, the creation of effective
legal structures, thus undermining the appropriateness of the big-bang approach?
Awareness of the importance of the role played by institutions in market economies has been
1"Shock therapy" was another phrase used synomously with big-bang.
2For example, see Shleifer and Vishny (1998, p. 253): "In fact, some have argued that Russia has been mistaken
in beginning with economic reforms and delaying political and institutional reforms .... But this evaluation ignores a
critical interaction between economic and political reforms, namely that economic reforms create pressure for political
reforms."
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keen since North (1990) and is emphasized, for example, in Djankov and Murrell (2002). The focus
on legal institutions and their importance, though not directed toward economies in transition, is
also highlighted, for example, in papers by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999), and La
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998). In addition, the attack on the Washington
Consensus spearheaded by Stiglitz (1999) forcefully argued that institutional development needed
to precede other reforms, including privatization.
Models of the transition of planned economies to market economies generally have taken as
given that convergence to market economies will be achieved. Some of these models are Aghion and
Blanchard (1994), Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1995), Dwatripont and Roland (1995), and Katz
and Owen (1993, 2000). No one has yet provided a theoretical argument showing the convergence of
a country without a strong legal structure to one with a strong legal structure. However, recently, a
number of papers have appeared that look at the question of the possible forestalling effect of too-
rapid and too-early mass privatization on the subsequent development of adequate legal protections
in a transition economy. These include Hoff and Stiglitz (2004), Polishchuk and Savvateev (2004),
and Sonin (2003). The forestalling effect investigated in these works is the lack of public support
for the enforcement of property rights, or simply for the rule of law.
Hoff and Stiglitz (hereafter HS) propose a model in which agents, who control firms, must
decide either to strip assets or to add value to their firm. Allowing for different types of agents and
a voting scheme that permits agents to choose between the rule of law or continuing in a lawless
regime, they show that there is an equilibrium in which agents may not vote to impose the rule of
law. Polishchuk and Savvateev (hereafter PS) consider a model in which agents must decide how
to split resources between production and appropriation. They show that production inefficiency
and economic inequality, in combination, cause wealthier agents to be against full protection of
property rights. Sonin (hereafter S) considers a model with agents of varying wealth who may
invest part of that wealth to protect their property rights. He shows that wealthier agents prefer
incomplete protection of these rights. To the degree that support for the enforcement of the rule
of law yields that enforcement, and that this enforcement is a necessity in a market economy, the
conclusions reached in these papers weaken the position advocated in the big-bang approach.
In HS, the government plays no direct role in the optimization issues faced by the agents, but
passively ratifies their choices. In PS and S, comparisons of equilibria with and without property
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rights are made from the viewpoints of the agents: involvement of the government in the choice
to establish these rights is not considered. On the other hand, in all three models, it is assumed
that the government has exhibited its power by already having granted property rights, and may
further exercise its power by enforcing the rule of law. This suggests that the government has its
own objectives to achieve, and that the realization of these objectives depends on public support.
In our model we acknowledge this, and move the government from a passive player to an active
participant in the determination of society’s support for the rule of law.
The model we present captures the interaction between a government and agents when the
government has an objective to attain. Both the government and the agents play an active role in
our work. Through activities it undertakes, the government provides signals that the agents use to
evaluate the probability that the government will move to enforce the rule of law. Based on these
evaluations, the agents decide whether to be law abiding or not. Thus, through its activities, the
government affects the choice of the agents as to whether to steal or not. Significantly, the agents’
decisions must be made prior to knowing whether or not the rule of law will be enforced. We take
the level of honesty established in society in the face of this uncertainty to be a measure of support
for the rule of law: the greater the level of honesty, the larger the constituency for the rule of law.
The government’s interest in the rule of law is presumed to derive from the benefits its receives
from it. For example, the government may wish to attract FDI or may wish to be accepted into
international organizations such as the WTO or the EU. Knowing that corruption might impede
its chances of success, a government might undertake activities to influence the agents in such a
way that corruption is reduced, thereby increasing support for the government’s goal. Thus, in our
model, the collective choice of the agents has an impact on the benefits the government receives.
Given this interaction, we examine the strategic choice of the government to achieve its desired
objective.
In our paper we show the conditions under which activities performed by the government will
maximize the benefits to the government and, at the same time, maximize the constituency in
support of the rule of law. This result supports the argument for the big-bang. The support,
however, depends on the particular characteristics of the country involved, namely, the initial
confidence that agents have in the government, the type of activities the government chooses to
perform, and the ability of the government to pay for those activities. When these characteristics
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are properly aligned, success in attaining the government’s objectives coincides with society’s full
support for the establishment of the rule of law.
We also show conditions under which the attainment of the government’s objectives is not
consistent with full support for the rule of law. In this case, the pursuit of the government’s
objectives leaves some corruption, and when the level of corruption in society is sufficiently elevated,
these conditions yield an argument that weakens the case for the big-bang. We later argue that
the Russian experience exemplifies these circumstances.
Of the various characteristics that distinguish the two situations described above, two stand
out as particularly important in our analysis: the initial level of corruption in society and the types
of activities the government chooses to undertake. By presenting four examples, we investigate the
relative importance to our conclusions of each of these characteristics separately, as well as jointly.
We demonstrate that the initial level of corruption in society has the most dramatic impact on
society’s subsequent support for the rule of law.
In part 2 we present our model. Results are contained in part 3 and four examples are presented
in part 4. A discussion of our results appears in part 5.
2. The Model
We consider a country defined by a government (G), a legal system, agents and firms. G has at
its disposal a variety of activities. As a consequence of the activities it implements, a level of
corruption is established, which has an impact on the benefits G receives from its activities. These
activities are costly and are financed by taxing firms. We assume that G has already pursued a
policy that has resulted in agents having received control rights over firms. However, the legal
system is incomplete in that the enforcement of contracts, in part or in whole, is uncertain.
Each agent controls one firm, and having observed the activities of G, decides whether or not
to steal funds from her firm. Collectively, a percentage of the agents will choose to steal, and
this percentage is called the level of corruption in the country. We assume that G’s benefits are
monotonically related to this level of corruption. Thus, we assume that G’s interest in reducing
corruption is driven by the benefits it gets from this reduction but not the reduction per se. Subject
to its taxing ability, G seeks a level of activities to maximize its benefits. The choice of the optimal
level of activities yields a corresponding level of corruption in the society. This level of corruption,
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or its complement, the level of honesty, the end product of the interaction between G and the
agents, is the focus of our analysis. We seek to determine the conditions under which it is in G’s
interest to eradicate corruption.
2.1. Government
We assume G’s many activities are ordered and brought into correspondence with a variable,
y ≥ ymin.We refer to y as the level of activities undertaken by G and assume that its initial level is
y = y0 ≥ ymin and that y ∈ [0,∞]. For each level of y chosen, a level of corruption is induced. We
denote this level as 1− p(y) where p(y) is the proportion of agents in the society who choose to be
honest. We assume that the benefits to G of choosing y depend on y through p(y). We denote this
benefits function as B[p(y)] and assume that it is a monotonic increasing function of p(y). The cost
associated with the implementation of y is C(y), which is assumed to be convex with C(y) ≥ 0 for
y ≥ ymin, C(y0) = 0 and C 0(y) > 0 for y ≥ y0. (For later convenience, we think of C(y) as cost per
capita.) Also, each y chosen by G yields tax revenues to G which we denote by T (y). We assume
that G has the power to tax all funds that are not stolen.
2.2. Legal System
Our model is a one period model in which all decisions are made at the beginning of the period and
the resolution of all uncertainty occurs at the end. The incomplete legal system makes it uncertain
to the agents as to whether there will be complete enforcement of contracts at the end of the period.
We assume that at the end of the period complete enforcement either will or will not be established.
By complete enforcement we mean that if an agent stole at the beginning of the period, she would
be caught at the end and would have to relinquish all money stolen. Otherwise, she would not be
caught and she would keep what she had stolen.
Because G is ultimately involved in whether or not enforcement ensues, each agent must assess
G’s intent in this direction. We assume that y, G’s level of activities, is a signal for G’s intensions.
Thus, based on y, each agent forms a subjective probability π(y) that complete enforcement will
occur at the end of the period. We refer to this outcome as the establishment of the rule of law.
We assume that each agent assesses y in the same manner, i.e., π(y) is common to all agents. We
assume further that the correspondence between the activities and the variable y implies that π(y)
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is a non-decreasing, differentiable, function of y. Because these probabilities are used by the agents
in their decisions to steal or not, G’s choice of y indirectly affects the proportion of agents who
choose to be honest, i.e., p(y).
2.3. Agents: Determination of p(y)
We assume there is a single agent controlling each firm and this agent is indexed by the value
τ , τ ∈ [0, 1], which represents the proportion of the firm’s assets the agent would steal if she choose
to steal. Also, we denote by H[τ ; y] the proportion of agents that would steal no more than τ from
their firms if G chose y as its level of activities. We assume that this family of distributions H[τ ; y]
has a partial derivative ∂H[τ ;y]∂τ = h[τ ; y], which is a proper density with h[τ ; y] = 0 for τ /∈ [0, τ(y)],
τ(y) ≤ 1. The upper bound τ(y) reflects the possible activities in which G, for example, cracks
down on large thieves, thereby reducing the range of thefts possible. We assume that τ(ymin) = 1,
τ(∞) = 0, and τ 0(y) ≤ 0. Furthermore, we assume that by undertaking more activities, G can
induce the society to become more "honest," i.e., ∂H[τ ;y]∂y ≥ 0 for τ ∈ [0, τ(y)) and
∂H[τ ;y]
∂y = 0 for
τ /∈ [0, τ(y)).
Agent τ may or may not steal. If agent τ chooses to steal, she steals τ percent of the firm’s
value, τ ∈ [0, τ(y)], leaving (1− τ) percent of the firm to continue to the end of the period. Each
agent, honest or not, retains δ ≤ 1 percent of the value of the firm at the end of the period, the
remaining (1 − δ) percent going to G as taxes. The interest rate is set at zero. We assume that
for each choice of y by G, each agent knows the probability π(y) that contracts will be completely
enforced at the end of the period, i.e., that the rule of law will prevail. All firms have an initial
value f, which, at the end of the period is either f(1 + kH) or f(1 + kL), kH > kL > −1, kH > 0,
depending on whether the end-of-period state is the rule of law, or not, respectively. The rates
kH and kL represent the rates of increase per dollar value of the firm in the two instances. We
assume that each agent is an expected value maximizer. We first establish the explicit form for the
percentage of honest agents (and thereby the level of corruption) that follows from G’s choice of y.
Let r(y) = π(y)1−π(y) be the odds ratio and let β =
δ(1+kH)
1−δ(1+kL) .
R1. (a) If δ(1 + kL) < 1 and π(y) 6= 1, then p(y) = H[βr(y); y].
(b) If either δ(1 + kL) ≥ 1 or π(y) = 1, then p(y) = 1.
Proof. Part (a): If agent τ chooses to be honest, then her expected value is δ[π(y)f(1+ kH) +
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(1−π(y))f(1+kL)].3 If agent τ chooses to steal, she steals fτ at the outset of the period, reducing
the value of the firm to f(1−τ). Having assumed that the agent receives zero if the final state is the
rule of law, if agent τ chooses to steal, she expects (1−π(y))[fτ + δf(1− τ)(1+kL)]. Since agent τ
will choose to be honest if her expected revenue from being honest is at least as large as her expected
revenue from stealing, agent τ will choose to be honest if δ[π(y)f(1 + kH) + (1 − π(y))f(1 + kL)]
≥ (1−π(y))[fτ+δf(1−τ)(1+kL)]. Simplifying, we have δπ(y)f(1+kH) ≥ (1−π(y))[fτ−δfτ(1+
kL)] = fτ(1− π(y))[1− δ(1+ kL)]. This inequality is the same as r(y)δ(1+ kH) ≥ τ [1− δ(1+ kL)].
Since δ(1 + kL) < 1, the last inequality is βr(y) ≥ τ . It follows from the definition of H[τ ; y] that
the proportion of agents that will be honest is given by H[βr(y); y]. This is what was called p(y).
Part (b): In the proof of part (a) we came to the inequality π(y)δ(1 + kH) ≥ (1− π(y))fτ [1−
δ(1 + kL)] for agent τ to be honest. If either δ(1 + kL) ≥ 1 or π(y) = 1, the right-hand-side of this
inequality is non-positive for all τ ∈ [0, τ(y)] and the result follows.♣
As we see in R1, the percentage of honest agents depends on two consequences of G’s selection
of y. The first consequence is the indirect consequence through r(y), and the second is the direct
effect on H of y. An implication is that if r(y) did not depend on y, but H did, G’s choice would
still alter the level of corruption. Similarly, if H were not affected by y but r(y) were, then G’s
choice would again affect the level of corruption.
For a given y, H[βr(y); y] decreases as either β or r(y) decrease. It follows that the level of
corruption will rise for a given level of y if either β or r(y) falls. In particular, β will be smaller, the
smaller the values of δ and kH . Since δ is 1− the tax rate, the rule above establishes a connection
between taxation and corruption. That is, corruption will increase with an increasing tax rate,
albeit in a non-linear fashion. The value of (1 + kH) represents the added value to the firm due to
the establishment of the rule of law. In weak economies we would expect kH to be small, and thus
not provide a great incentive for agent τ to remain honest.
The functional form of π(y) and thus r(y), taken as given in this model, reflects the agents’
perceptions of the relationship between G’s actions at the outset of the period and the enforcement
of the rule of law at the end of the period. This perception is partially rooted in the confidence
that the society has that its government’s activities will lead to the enforcement of the rule of law.
3We assume that any investment required by the agent would have to be made at the outset of the period and
would be the same whether the agent chooses to steal or not. Otherwise, it would expose the intent of the agent.
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Normally this confidence will differ from country to country, so we would expect corruption to vary
accordingly.
The restriction that δ(1 + kL) < 1 implies that the firm’s performance would be sufficiently
poor, should the rule of law not prevail, so as to be an unattractive outcome to some agents. When
this restriction does not hold, part (b) shows that no matter the outcome at the end of the period,
no agent would steal. For the remainder of the paper we consider the more interesting case in which
some level of corruption could exist, i.e., we assume δ(1 + kL) < 1.
2.4. Determination of T (y)
G needs revenue to finance its activities. The tax revenues, on the other hand, are not available to
G until the end of the period so G must plan on the basis of expected tax revenues. We think of
these expected revenues as collateral for the loan G might take at the beginning of the period to
finance its activities.
For each τ ≤ βr(y) and y fixed, agent τ chooses to be honest and the tax rate (1− δ) is applied
to the expected value of the firm. This equals (1− δ)[π(y)f(1 + kH) + (1− π(y))f(1 + kL)]. Since
each honest agent has the same expected value, the proportion of agents that have this expected
tax bill is (1 − δ)p(y)[π(y)f(1 + kH) + (1 − π(y))f(1 + kL)]. For each τ > βr(y) and y fixed, the
agent chooses to steal. If the rule of law prevails, the agent forfeits all money to G; thus, with
probability π(y), G receives fτ + f(1 − τ)(1 + kH). If on the other hand, the rule of law doesn’t
prevail, the agent only pays taxes on the part of the firm she did not steal and, with probability
1− π(y), G gets the amount (1− δ)f(1− τ)(1 + kL). Therefore, if agent τ steals, G expects from
this agent π(y)[fτ + f(1 − τ)(1 + kH)] + (1 − π(y))[(1 − δ)f(1 − τ)(1 + kL)]. Since this expected
value depends on τ , we must sum over all values of τ > βr(y). The expected tax revenue in this
case becomes π(y)(1−p(y))[fµC+f(1−µC)(1+kH)]+(1−π(y))(1−p(y))[(1−δ)f(1−µC)(1+kL]
where µC is the conditional mean value of τ given that agent τ chooses to steal. In sum, for G’s
level of activities fixed at y,
T (y) = fp(y)(1− δ)[π(y)(1 + kH)] + (1− π(y))(1 + kL)]
+f(1− p(y))[π(y)(1 + (1− µC)kH + (1− π(y))(1− δ)(1− µC)(1 + kL).
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2.5. G’s problem
We assume that G is seeking an optimal level of activities y∗ to maximize its benefits, which in
turn depend on the level of honesty (corruption) in society. G’s level of activities prior to seeking
y∗ was assumed to be y0, and, at that value, the corresponding level of corruption was 1− p0. We
further assume that G is constrained by having to pay for its activities from tax revenue, and that
should there be more than one optimal level of activities, G would choose the least costly.4 We
now state G’s problem: G chooses y∗ such that
y∗ = min{arg max
y≥ymin
B[p(y)]}
s.t. T (y) ≥ C(y)
p(y) = H[βr(y); y]
p0 = H[βr(y0); y0]
y0 ≥ ymin.
3. Results
We define yM to be the smallest value of y such that p(y) = 1. If p(y) < 1 for all values of y, then
yM =∞.
R2. (a) p0(y) ≥ 0 for y ≥ ymin.
(b) If π0(y) > 0 for y ≥ ymin then p0(y) > 0 for ymin ≤ y < yM .
Proof. (a) p0(y) = dH[βr(y);y]dy = h[βr(y); y]βr
0(y) + ∂H[βr(y);y]∂y . Since h[·; y] is a density, it is
non-negative for all y. Also, r0(y) = π
0(y)
[1−π(y)]2 is non-negative since π is non-decreasing in y. Finally,
by assumption, ∂H[βr(y);y]∂y ≥ 0 for all y ≥ ymin and part (a) follows.
(b) Since yM is the smallest value of y for which p(y) = 1, it satisfies βr(yM) = τ(yM). Since
H is continuous for any ymin ≤ y < yM , βr(y) < τ(y), i.e., βr(y) ∈ [0, τ(y)). Thus, h[βr(y); y] > 0
and since π0(y) > 0, so is r0(y) and part (b) follows.♣
This result shows that an increase in G’s level of activities produces an increase in the level of
honesty in society. This is consistent with our earlier remarks that the variable y is in correspon-
dence with a sequence of ever-more-beneficial activities. Also, in the last proof, we see that a change
4Other sources of revenue for G, for example, foreign assistance, we interprete as reducing the cost of G’s activities.
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in society’s level of honesty has two sources. The first source is the impact of G’s activities on the
agents’ subjective evaluation of the future and the second is the direct impact of G’s activities in
reducing criminal behavior. The absence of either of these effects alone would not be enough to
alter the results of R2.
R3. Let yM <∞. Then π(yM) < 1, i.e., π(yM) < p(yM).
Proof. Since yM satisfies βr(yM) = τ(yM), it follows that β π(yM )1−π(yM ) = τ(yM). Thus, π(yM) =
τ(yM )
τ(yM )+β < 1 and the result follows.♣
In this model π(y) is formulated and used by the agents in choosing to be honest or not. The
proportion who choose to be honest, p(y), results from the collective choice of the agents, all using
the same π(y). This result shows that for full support for the rule of law to be achieved at the
end of the period, it is not necessary for all agents to be certain that this will happen. In fact,
depending on various parameters, β in particular, π(y∗) could be very small. In an expected value
sense, if the rewards in a lawful society are high enough, a small probability will be enough for all
agents to pursue these rewards.
We next define the feasible set of y values as I = {y : T (y) ≥ C(y), y ≥ ymin} and we let max I
be the largest y ∈ I. For the remainder of the paper we assume yM <∞.
R4. If B(p) is a strictly increasing function of p, and if π0(y) > 0 for y ≥ ymin, then
(a) the unique maximum y∗ exists and satisfies
(1) y∗ = max I if max I < yM,
(2) y∗ ≥ y0,
(3) y∗ = min{y : y ∈ I, y > yM} if max I > yM and if yM /∈ I,
(4) y∗ = yM if yM ∈ I.
(b) If y∗ 6= yM , then the constraint is binding, i.e., C(y∗) = T (y∗).
Proof. (a) Given our assumptions, it is easily seen that T (y) ≤ f(1+ kH) for all y. Since C(y)
was assumed to be a convex strictly increasing function of y, there will be a finite value of y beyond
which T (y) < C(y). Thus, max I < ∞. Furthermore, T (y0) ≥ 0 and C(y0) = 0 so y0 ∈ I. Thus, it
follows that I is not empty, max I is finite, and max I ≥ y0. Since π0(y) > 0 for y ≥ ymin, it follows
from R2 that p(y) is strictly increasing for ymin ≤ y ≤ yM and since B[p(y)] is strictly increasing
in p(y), when max I < yM the benefits function achieves its unique maximum at y∗ = max I.
Furthermore, since max I ≥ y0, y∗ ≥ y0.
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Since p(y) = 1 for all y ≥ yM , B[p(y)] is constant over this interval. So, when max I ≥ yM ,
the unique minimum cost of activities that achieves the maximum benefits is y∗ = min{y : y ∈ I,
y ≥ yM}. This minimum is yM when yM ∈ I.
(b) If yM /∈ I and max I < yM , then y∗ = max I must occur at the highest value of y
such that T (y) ≥ C(y), i.e., when T (y) = C(y). If max I > yM and if yM /∈ I, then y∗ = min{y :
y ∈ I, y > yM} must occur at the smallest value of y > yM such that C(y) ≥ T (y), i.e., when
T (y) = C(y).♣
The solution to G’s problem as exhibited in R4 shows the importance of the relationship of
elements in the feasible set I to the particular values y0 and yM . The first of these values is a given
initial condition, and the second depends on other parameters through the distribution H[·; y].
Neither I, y0 nor yM depend on the benefits function B(p). Thus, the solution would remain the
same for any benefits function so long as it were strictly increasing with respect to p(y). Since
this property of the benefits function seems appropriate for many countries, R4 implies that a
comparison of countries should focus on the cost and taxation functions as well as on the initial
conditions, i.e., on the feasible set I.
A unique solution to G’s problem always exists as we see in R4 and, so long as B[p(y)] is
increasing in p(y), the level of corruption will not increase, that is, p(y∗) ≥ p0. We note that in
the economies in transition, the initial conditions of the governments seeking to establish market
economies were varied. Some countries had stronger links to a democratic past, it is said, while
others did not. We can think of p0 as a surrogate for such features. Larger values of p0 can be
thought of as providing a running start to the creation of the rule of law.
Results in R4 part (a) imply that if the max I ≤ yM , y∗ will be between y0 and yM . The value
yM will be close to y0 if r(y), or equivalently π(y), increases rapidly with y. This would happen if
society believed that the actions taken by G at the outset of the period would, with high probability,
lead to the rule of law at the end of the period; that is, if society trusted its government to proceed
to this end. High trust would imply that y0 and yM were close, implying further that the rule of
law, or something close to it, would be established.
Part (b) shows that even though benefits are constant for y ≥ yM , it is possible that the
minimum cost, non-budget-breaking solution, will exceed yM . In this case, and all other cases except
for the one excluded in part (b), the tax revenues will exactly equal the costs of implementing the
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activities, i.e., the constraint will be binding. In the exceptional case when yM ∈ I, the minimum
cost solution need not yield a binding constraint.
R5. (a) If max I ≥ yM , then it is in G’s interest to undertake enough activities to result in a
lawful society, i.e., p(y∗) = 1.
(b) If C(yM) ≤ (1− δ)f [π(yM)(1+ kH) + (1− π(yM))(1+ kL)] then yM ∈ I, y∗ = yM , and
it is in G’s interest to undertake enough activities to yield a lawful society, i.e., 1− p(y∗) = 0.
Proof. (a) From R4, it follows that if max I ≥ yM then y∗ ≥ yM . Thus p(y∗) = p(yM) = 1 and
G’s optimum activity level yields a completely lawful society.
(b) Since p(yM) = 1, T (yM) = (1 − δ)f [π(yM)(1 + kH) + (1 − π(yM))(1 + kL)]. So, if
C(yM) ≤ (1− δ)f [π(yM)(1+kH)+(1−π(yM))(1+kL)], then C(yM) ≤ T (yM). Thus, yM ∈ I and
from R4, y∗ = yM and the level of corruption is 1− p(yM) = 0.♣
The model we are discussing is meant to capture important features of the big-bang. R5 part
(a) demonstrates conditions under which a major claim made by supporters of the big-bang holds;
specifically, that a constituency supporting the rule of law would form from agents in the society
who had earlier received control rights to firms. Here we see the situation in which, after such rights
have been granted, G’s interaction with the agents in fact yields a lawful society. This support
for the big-bang must be qualified by the given condition that max I ≥ yM . This condition would
hold, cet. par., if costs were smaller than tax revenues over a larger range of y values. Thus, for
example, if the country were receiving external aid to subsidize its activities, and used the aid for
these purposes, this would tend to diminish the costs of the activities and more likely create the
required condition of this result. This was undoubtedly part of the intent of the donors of such
monies. We can think of this situation as what happened between the IMF and Russia or between
the EU and the eastern European countries that recently jointed the EU. It was clear in these cases
that external funding was to aid G in choosing activities that would improve society. In Russia,
for example, it appears that these external funds were not used in all cases as the international
agencies intended, or that the tax revenues were not sufficient to satisfy the required condition.
Part (b) of R5 shows a specific condition that lends support to the big-bang argument. This
condition states that when the cost function rises slowly enough so as not to exceed the bound
(1 − δ)f [π(yM)(1 + kH) + (1 − π(yM))(1 + kL)] at y = yM , an honest society would result. This
reinforces the point raised above that when external funding does indeed reduce the cost of G’s
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activities, it can have a major effect on society. When the cost rises sufficiently quickly, the impact
on society can be quite different, as we next show in R6.
R6. (a) If max I < yM , then it is in G’s interest not to undertake enough activities to rid
society of corruption, i.e., 1− p(y∗) > 0.
(b) If C(yM) > (1− δ)f [π(yM)(1+ kH)+ (1−π(yM))(1+ kL)] and if π(y) is concave, then
max I < yM , y∗ < yM , and it is in G’s interest not to undertake enough activities to rid society of
corruption, i.e., 1− p(y∗) > 0.
Proof. (a) From R4, when max I < yM , y∗ < yM . Thus, p(y∗) < 1 and some corruption
remains, i.e., 1− p(y∗) > 0.
(b) Using the argument in the proof of R5 part (b), we have at yM , C(yM) > T (yM) or
yM /∈ I. That π(y) is concave implies that T (y) is concave for y ≥ yM . Since C(y) is convex and is
strictly increasing, it follows that C(y) > T (y) for y ≥ yM or that max I < yM . This implies that
y∗ < yM and again that 1− p(y∗) > 0.♣
Here the argument given earlier in support of the big-bang is considerably weakened. The more
max I is below yM , the greater is the level of corruption. Greater levels of dishonesty in society are
interpreted here as less support for the rule of law. On the other hand, from R4 part (a), we know
that the level of corruption must be less than 1 − p0. Thus, depending on the size of this initial
condition, one country might have a built-in-support for the rule of law whereas another might not.
We next investigate these impacts on corruption, as well as other properties of this model, through
examples.
4. Examples
We present four examples to illustrate our model. In these examples we vary the assumptions
made about H[τ ; y] and the initial conditions. However, the following specifications hold for all
the examples. With no loss of generality we let f = 1. If the rule of law prevails at the end of the
period, we assume that all firms benefit from this improved climate by an increase in value of 33%;
otherwise, all lose an equal percentage. The taxation rate is 25%. In sum, we let f = 1, kH = 1/3,
kL = −1/3, and δ = 3/4. It follows that β = δ(1+kH)1−δ(1+kL) = 2. We assume that ymin = 1, thus
establishing the minimum unit of G’s activities, and we interprete y− 1, y ≥ 1, as the proportional
increase in G’s level of activities. Since we assume G has already established property rights in
15
our model, i.e., undertaken some activities, we set y0 = 1.1. We further assume that the agents’
subjective probabilities take the form π(y) = a(y−1)1+a(y−1) , y ≥ 1, where a is chosen to satisfy the
initial conditions. We note that π(y) is a concave function. Next we assume that the cost function
C(y) = 0 for ymin ≤ y ≤ y0 and is c(y − y0) for y > y0. B(p) is assumed to be a monotonic strictly
increasing function of p(y) throughout.
4.1. Example 1
We assume that G’s activities affect π(y) but not H[τ ; y] directly. Specifically, we assume the
density of τ is uniform on [0, 1] for all values of y ≥ 1. Thus H[τ ; y] = τ for τ ∈ [0, 1], H[τ ; y] = 0
for τ ≤ 0 and H[τ ; y] = 1 for τ > 1. Last, we assume that the rate of corruption at the outset of the
period is 1− p0 = .9. Using these specifications we now can locate the solution y∗ to G’s problem.
We first determine a to satisfy the initial conditions. Since p(y) = H[βr(y); y] our asumptions
imply p(y) = βa(y − 1). Thus, a must satisfy 2a(1.1 − 1) = .1 or a = 1/2. Then yM satisfies
βr(y) = 1 or y − 1 = 1, i.e., yM = 2.
We next evaluate C(y) and T (y) at yM . C(yM) = c(yM−y0) = c(.9). T (yM) = (1−δ)f [π(yM)(1+
kH) + (1 − π(yM))(1 + kL)] = 1/4[(1/3)(4/3) + (2/3)(2/3)] = 2/9. If we let the breakeven cost in
this example, cB1, be the marginal cost that makes C(yM) = T (yM), then cB1 = 20/81 = .247.
Thus, from R5, y∗ = yM = 2 if c ≤ .247. From R6, if c >.247, then y∗ < 2 and it is not in G’s
interest to undertake enough activities to eliminate all corruption.
At the outset of the period we assumed that the initial activity level was y0 = 1.1. For this
level, the percentage of agents that chose to be honest was assumed to be p0 = .1. This implied
that π(y) =
1
2
(y−1)
1+ 1
2
(y−1) and we can compute the π(y) value that links y0 to p0, i.e., π(y0). This value
is .048. Thus, in this example, at the outset of the period, the agents are extrememly pessimistic
as to the outcome of the rule of law barring any further activities by G. If c ≤ cB1, then G would
undertake the activity level yM = 2 which would cause the agents to reevaluate their probabilities
as π(yM) = 1/3. This value, held by all agents, is sufficient in this example to cause all agents to
choose to be honest.
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4.2. Example 2
In this example we retain the assumptions about the distribution of τ made in Example 1, but
we increase the percentage of agents who choose to be honest at the outset of the period, letting
p0 = .25. Recomputing, we have a = 1.25, yM = 1.4, C(yM) = c(.3), and T (yM) = .222. The
breakeven cost, cB2, that makes C(yM) = T (yM) is cB2 = .741.
The results of Example 2 compared to Example 1 show the important role played by the initial
degree of corruption in a society. Since the breakeven cost represents the marginal cost at which
society would be completely rid of corruption, we can use this figure to compare the different
examples. As we see in Example 2, cB2 is three times as large as cB1, so that more costly activities
undertaken by G could still produce a lawful society.
Thus, the increase in p0 has a dramatic effect on reducing the level of corruption in society.
Examples 1 and 2 assume that the activities undertaken by G do not affect the attributes of crime
directly, i.e., do not affect the distribution of τ . If the activities did affect this distribution directly,
would it be true that the importance of the initial condition would diminish in comparison? The
next two examples address this question.
4.3. Example 3
We now return to the assumption that p0 = .1 but change the assumptions about H[τ ; y]. Here we
allow G to also affect the distribution of τ . We assume that the density of τ values is uniform on
[0, y−1] for y ≥ 1, i.e., h[τ ; y] = y, τ(y) = y−1 and ymin = 1. By increasing the level of activites y,
G reduces the possibility of larger crimes. This example captures the idea that G could institute a
campaign against its bigger thieves or those perceived to be its bigger thieves (as in Russia witness
the campaign against the oligarchs and in the U.S. against the Enrons, etc.). Thus, H[τ ; y] = yτ
for τ ∈ [0, y−1], H[τ ; y] = 0 for τ ≤ 0 and H[τ ; y] = 1 for τ ≥ y−1. The value of a is computed from
βay(y0−1) = p0 or a = 12.2 . Then, yM must satisfy
2
2.2y(y−1) = 1 or yM =
1
2 [1+
√
1 + 4.4] = 1.662.
C(yM) = c(1.662− 1.1) = c(.562) and T (yM) = .205. The breakeven marginal cost in this example
is cB3 = .205.562 = .365. By allowing G to undertake activities to directly affect the distribution of
τ , yM , the level of activities needed to rid the society of corruption, has been reduced from 2 in
Example 1 to 1.662. The level of pessimism at the outset of the period, as measured by the agents’
subjective probability, remains essentially the same with π(y0) = .043, but the level of π in this case
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needed to achieve a completely honest societ is π(yM) = .231, substantially lower than in Example
1.
If G’s marginal cost were actually c = .3 and if, as in Example 1, the activities that G chose did
not affect the distribution of τ , then since cB1 < .3, the result of G’s activities would not rid the
society of corruption. However, at the same marginal cost, and if G’s activities had a direct affect
on the distribution of τ as in this example, then c = .3 < cB3 = .365, implying that for the same
expenditure G would be able to maximize its benefits and also create a corruption-free society.
Comparing the results of Examples 1 and 3, we find cB3 is 1.5 times cB1. Since the initial
conditions are the same in both examples, as is everything except for the assumptions concerning
the distribution of τ , we conclude that the increase in cB3 is due to the change in this assumption.
We find that, at a fixed level of expenditure, a set of activities that also impacts crime directly is
more likely to produce a corruption-free society than a set which has only indirect effects. Examples
1 and 2 show that the initial conditions matter, and now Examples 1 and 3 show that the type of
activities matter. Example 4 is meant to illustrate the relative sizes of these two effects.
4.4. Example 4
In this example we retain the asumptions about the distribution of τ made in Example 3, but
we increase the percentage of agents who choose to be honest at the outset of the period, letting
p0 = .25 as in Example 2. Recomputing, we have a = 1.136, yM = 1.331, C(yM) = c(.231),
T (yM) = .212, so that cB4 = .212.231 = .918. In this example when the initial conditions are more
favorable and when G’s activities both directly and indirectly affect the distribution of τ , the
breakeven value cB4 is close to 1. Recalling that f = 1 at the outset of the period, unless marginal
cost is truly excessive, G’s optimum choice would lead to a corruption-free society. The change in
the initial condition from that in Example 3 results in cB4 being 2.5 times cB3. Recall that the same
comparison between Examples 1 and 2 yielded cB2 being 3 times cB1. The changes in the breakeven
values when the types of activities varied yielded cB3 being 1.5 times cB1 at low initial conditions
and cB4 being 1.25 times cB2 at higher initial conditions. These examples suggest that the initial
conditions are more important to the outcome than the types of activities that G undertakes.
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5. Discussion and Conclusions
Our model depends on a number of assumptions that we now discuss. In evaluating the level of
honesty, p(y), we assumed that kH , kL, and δ, the parameters making up β, were constants, not
depending on either τ , the agent’s "index of thievery," or y, G’s level of activities. Had we assumed
β = β(y), the results would have remained essentially the same. Assuming that β = β(τ) would
have introduced some additional complexity into the model but, again, would have led to similar
results.
We assumed that the agents, using as a signal the level of activities undertaken by G, evaluated
G’s progression to the rule of law through the subjective probability π(y). Implicitly, we assumed
that the functional form of π was fixed in society. One could have assumed that an activity that
G might undertake, say of a propagandistic nature, would influence the way agents evaluated the
signal, changing the form of π. For example, countries with high levels of corruption, which find
it extremely costly to reduce this corruption, might have as their only recourse to try to modify
public opinion through π. Extending the model to allow the functional form of π to also depend on
y remains.
We assumed that, should the rule of law be established at the end of the period, there would be
strict enforcement. This enforcement took the form in the model of the assumption that all monies
would be forfeited by the thief under this circumstance. Less restrictive assumptions could have
been made, including random enforcement, without altering the general conclusions presented.
We assumed that G’s problem was a one-period problem. Obviously, over time, governments
change, as do costs and benefits. Thus, following the reasoning of our model, it would not be
surprising to find fluctuations in support for the rule of law without any guarantee of convergence.
This is another area for future investigation.
A few other points bear mentioning. We have assumed that there is a time gap between the
formation of support for the rule of law and its subsequent enforcement. But there is no guarantee
that even full support for the rule of law by a society at one moment in time will lead to the
establishment of the rule of law at a later time. Since governments, as well as economic climates,
change, the conclusion that full support for the rule of law results in its complete enforcement cannot
always hold. Furthermore, if we accept the fact thatG can influence society by its activities, G could
choose to be duplicitous by raising support for the rule of law with no intention of implementing
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it. How long would it take for such behavior to be found out?
Our model was chosen in order to provide a basis of argument for or against the method of
big-bang reforms. In general, we found that the question of the appropriateness of the big-bang
policy could only be answered after the initial conditions of the country under study had been
determined, and we showed how this might be done. Our model, however, stands alone and is
separate from the issue of the big-bang. Many G’s derive benefits dependent on the level of honesty
of their societies. For example, increases in FDI have been shown to correlate with decreases in
corruption (See Wei (2000)).
In the same vein, countries that had the possibility of acceding to the European Union were
promised many benfits if they imposed and enforced a rule of law, that is, if they brought their
laws into compliance with those of the EU. Thus, all these countries had the promise of benefits
that would increase with the level of honesty of society. However, neither the costs of enforcing the
rule of law, nor the initial conditions of these countries, were identical. Thus, our model offers an
explanation as to why countries would have differing successes in complying with the EU’s acquis
and hence why the EU gave them different entry dates.
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